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This paper explores the literature on understanding and interpreting parents’ 
motivations for the participation of their child in medical research. The paper 
analyses how and to what extent ethics of care theory can enhance how we both 
understand and interpret parents’ motivations for research participation. Analysis is 
focused on the level of attention that needs to be given to a child in the context of his 
or her caring relationships and the responsibilities that arise within these 
relationships. This paper seeks to illustrate how it is necessary to move away from an 
individualistic approach to decision-making to one that refocuses our attention on the 
web of relationships within which a child is usually placed.  
 
Sufficient acknowledgement and appropriate treatment of the complex interests and 
responsibility in caring relationships is crucial to determining the suitability of 
decision-making about child participation in medical research. If care ethics provides 
an improved understanding and interpretation of parents’ motivations for research 
participation, then it is necessary to consider the extent to which this improved 
understanding and interpretation of parents’ motivations based on care theory can 
usefully inform principles that underpin existing ethical and legal frameworks for 
decision-making. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Decision-making frameworks that regulate child participation in medical research 
should strike an appropriate balance between protecting research participants and 
facilitating sound research.1 There is increasing focus on a complex debate about 
children’s rights to self-determination and empowerment, focussing largely on issues 
 
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, UK 
1 Current ethical and legal frameworks restate principles found in the Nuremberg Code and the 1954 
World Medical Association (hereafter ‘WMA’) Declaration of Helsinki (most recently revised in 
October 2013). Professional bodies in the United Kingdom (hereafter ‘UK’) have issued guidance on 
good practice in research: the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health guidance, ‘Ethics 
Advisory Committee guidelines for the ethical conduct of medical research involving children’, (2000) 
82 Archives of Disease in Childhood 177; General Medical Council guidance, for example, GMC 
(2010), Good practice in research and consent to research, and GMC (2007), 0-18 years: guidance for 
all doctors; Medical  Research Council guidance, for example, MRC (2004), MRC ethics guide: 
medical research involving children. Reference to a ‘child’ is someone aged 0-18 years. 
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of procedure and informed consent,2 with inadequate attention being given to the 
more substantive issue of how decisions about research participation are made and the 
role of parents as decision-makers for their children’s participation in the ‘activity’ of 
medical research. 3  The rights of children and their families continue to demand 
protection and safeguarding, as one must always remain vigilant of conflicting 
interests and the pressure of commercial gain in the realm of research. In maintaining 
vigilance about what is being asked of parents, it is crucial to improve our 
understanding and interpretation of parents’ motivations for the participation of their 
child in medical research. 
 
 
There are “two long-standing issues of ethical concern” 4  that are described as 
“inherent”5 to medical research practice: the first issue being “the tension between the 
welfare of the individual and the welfare of the group”,6 and the second issue being 
“the constantly shifting boundaries between acceptable therapy and research”. 7 
Liaschenko and Underwood conclude that:  
 
More than a century of modern medical research has suggested that the ethical 
concerns arising from said research may be unresolvable. If that is so, research 
ethics will not provide a final resolution but, rather, will more likely serve as 
an ongoing cultural attempt to deal with the problems of research. Keeping 
aware of the actual practices of clinical research must lead to more than 
monitoring and refining procedural responses to ensure that clinical research is 
ethical.8  
 
 
2 Further detailed analysis of informed consent, child assent and dissent, and ‘Gillick Competence’ is 
beyond the scope of this paper, see Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112; Children 
Act 1989 s 3(1); Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 8(1), which applies only to therapeutic and diagnostic 
procedures; D Hunter, and BK Pierscionek, ‘Children, Gillick Competency and Consent for 
Involvement in Research’ (2007) 33(11) Journal of Medical Ethics 659; E Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? 
Identifying and resolving problems with the concept of child (2013) competence’ Legal Studies 1.  
3 C Petrini, ‘The Ethics of Paediatric Trials: Questions of Procedure and of Substance’ (2013) 81(2) 
Medico-Legal Journal 74; G Williams, ‘Children as means and ends in large-scale medical research’ 
(2011) Bioethics (online) 1; E Cave, ‘Seen but not heard? Children in clinical trials’ (2010) 18 Medical 
Law Review 1; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Children, Medicines, and Clinical Trials: Background 
Paper’, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Workshop: 9 December 2011; B Baylis, and J Downie, ‘The 
limits of altruism and arbitrary age limits’ (2006) 3(4) American Journal of Bioethics 19; TM Burke, R 
Abramovitch, and S Zlotkin, ‘Children’s Understanding of the Risks and Benefits Associated with 
Research’ (2005) 31(12) Journal of Medical Ethics 715; T John, T Hope, J Savulescu, A Stein, AJ 
Pollard, ‘Children’s consent and paediatric research: is it appropriate for healthy children to be the 
decision-makers in clinical research? (2008) 93 Archives of Disease in Childhood 379; I Singh, 
‘Capacity and competence in children as research participants’ (2007) 8 European Molecular Biology 
Association reports (special issue) S35; L Hagger, The Child As Vulnerable Patient: Protection and 
Empowerment, (Ashgate, 2009), Chapter 7 ‘Children in Research’, pp 175-211. 
4 J Liaschenko, and SM Underwood, ‘Children in Research: Fathers in Cancer Research – Meanings 
and Reasons for Participation’ (2001) 7(1) Journal of Family Nursing 71, at 72. RB Levi, R Marsick, D 
Drotar, E Kodish, ‘Diagnosis, Disclosure, and Informed Consent: Learning from Parents of Children 
with Cancer’ (2000) 22(1) Journal of Pediatric Hematology/Oncology 3. 
5 Ibid, at p 71. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, at p 88. 
 3 
There is limited data available that documents how parents experience the research 
process.9 And much of the literature that does consider research participation focuses 
on informed consent, rather than shedding any ‘new’ light on parental understanding 
and attitudes towards research.10 The few studies that have been done so far illustrate 
important findings about parents’ motivations for research participation and their 
‘journey’ of decision-making at a time when they “feel significant responsibility to 
act in the best interests of their children”.11  
 
 
Empirical evidence about the context in which decisions about child participation in 
medical research are made, particularly decisions about research that have the 
potential to benefit a child directly, will be case specific, or rather medical condition 
or illness specific. Fisher, McKevitt, and Boaz have explored the experiences of 
parents, living in different countries, whose children suffered from a range of medical 
conditions, which varied in severity.12 I will analyse some of the studies in Fisher, 
McKevitt, and Boaz’s paper to illustrate that calls for a broader approach “to gather 
the complexity” of the situation are justified, and that this broader approach “should 
examine needs, emotions, thoughts and fears of children and their families 
considering participation or participating already”. 13  Thus, a broader approach is 
needed to better appreciate the complexity of the decision-making process and how it 
is necessary to improve our understanding and interpretation of parents’ motivations 
regarding child participation in medical research.  
 
 
A. Empirical studies: the complexity of decision-making 
 
 
I will now analyse empirical evidence on the decision-making ‘journey’ that parents 
and their children follow to trace important findings about parents’ motivations for 
research participation. Evidence from the empirical studies suggests that care ethics is 
reflective of how families and children actually make decisions. Meanings of care 
have been explored through an analysis of its economic character in different domains 
of life and its ethical implications for rights-based discourses.14 It has been analysed 
that “care invokes a host of cluster concepts” and these include obligation, 
 
9 BJ Stenson, J-C Becher, N McIntosh, ‘Neonatal research: the parental perspective’ (2004) 89 
Archives of Disease in Childhood Fetal and Neonatal Edition F321; KS Hoehn, et al. ‘What factors are 
important to parents making decisions about neonatal research?’ (2005) 90 Archives of Disease in 
Childhood Fetal and Neonatal Edition F267; CJ Morley, et al. ‘What do parents think about enrolling 
their premature babies in several research studies? (2005) 90 Archives of Disease in Childhood Fetal 
and Neonatal Edition F225. 
10 H Chappuy, et al. ‘Parental Consent in paediatric clinical research’ (2006) 91 Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 112. 
11 HR Fisher, C McKevitt, and A Boaz, ‘Why do parents enroll their children in research: a narrative 
synthesis’ (2011) 37 Journal of Medical Ethics 544, at p 550.  
12 Ibid, at p 544. 
13 F Wulf, M Krasuka, and M Bullinger, ‘Determinants of decision-making and patient participation in 
paediatric clinical trials: A literature review’ (2012) 2 Open Journal of Pediatrics 1, at p 7. M 
Glogowska, S Roulstone, P Enderby, T Peters, and R Campbell, ‘Who’s afraid of the randomized 
controlled trial? Parents’ views of an SLT research study’ (2001) 36 International Journal of Language 
and Communication Disorders 499, at p 500. 
14 C Hughes, Key Concepts in Feminist Theory and Research (Sage Publications, 2002), at p 8. 
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dependency, responsibility, friendship, duty, reciprocity and trust.15 Speculation about 
decision-making for child participation in medical research has triggered discussion 
about the following:  
 
1. ‘positive obligations’; 
2. dependency in terms of the wider community of children depending on 
individual children to participate in research;  
3. responsibilities in terms of, (i) the responsibilities of physicians, (ii) the 
responsibility of children and their families to one another in their caring 
relationships, and (iii) the responsibility of the child and their family as a unit 
with respect to their assessment of risk and benefit informing their decision to 
participate in research or not because their decision will impact the wider 
community of children;  
4. the duty of physicians to child patients and their families; and,  
5. the trust that children and their families place in physicians when making any 
decision about research participation.  
 
 
Joan Tronto took note of various criticisms that tend to follow from relying heavily on 
the concept of care, namely that care is a fluid concept and too vague to be of use in 
transforming values.16 Tronto highlights that care involves a degree of conflict:17 
 
Care as a practice involves more than simply good intentions. It requires a 
deep and thoughtful knowledge of the situation, and of all the actors’ 
situations, needs and competencies. To use the care ethic requires a knowledge 
of the context of the care process. Those who engage in a care process must 
make judgements: judgements about needs, conflicting needs, strategies for 
achieving ends, the responsiveness of care receivers, and so forth… Care rests 
upon judgements that extend far beyond personal awareness.18 
 
Tronto’s focus on understanding both the nature of care and its place in human life is 
relevant to understanding decision-making about child participation in medical 
research. The fact that care must be understood in terms of its ability to invoke a host 
of cluster concepts, which include obligation, dependency, responsibility, duty, and 
trust, should be recognised as something positive, a strength of the concept as 
opposed to a weakness. This complexity reflects the reality of decision-making in 
difficult situations. Joe Brierly and Vic Larches 19  highlight the issue of family 
involvement in healthcare decision-making and support the influence of an ethic of 
care to facilitate decision-making. Brierly and Larches advocate that an ethic of care 
 
15 Ibid, at pp 118-119; Hughes draws upon the research of Silva and Smart (E Silva, and C Smart, (eds) 
The New Family? (London: Sage, 1999)), and Finch and Mason (J Finch, and J Mason, Negotiating 
Family Responsibilities, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
16 O Flanagan, and J Adler, ‘Impartiality and Particularity’ (1983) 50(3) Social Research 576; A 
Rudnick, ‘A Meta-Ethical Critique of Care Ethics’ (2005) 22(6) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 
505; M Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship’ (2000) 
8 Feminist Legal Studies 199; S Sevenhuijsen, ‘Caring in the third way: the relation between 
obligation, responsibility and care in Third Way discourse’ (2000) 20(5) Critical Social Policy 5. 
17 J Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge, 1993) at p 102. 
18 Ibid, at pp 136-137. 
19 J Brierley, and V Larcher, ‘Cui bono? Can feminist ethics show a path in complex decision-making 
where ‘classical’ theories cannot?’ (2011) 6 Clinical Ethics 86.  
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has the potential to provide “creative solutions to clinical situations not readily 
soluble by standard ethical norms”, suggesting that “moral thinking outside the 
restrictions of more traditional current medical ethics may help ease moral dilemmas 
and lead to a resolution that recognises and supports the humanity of those 
involved”.20  
 
 
The following analysis of empirical studies includes studies conducted both within 
and outside the UK; studies conducted outside the UK are mainly from the United 
States (US) and Canada. It should be noted that reference to mothers’ perspectives in 
my discussion of the empirical studies reflects the focus of the studies and the fact 
that most studies involved interviews with mothers only.21 
 
 
i. Vaccine research  
 
 
Paediatric vaccine studies in the UK have been subject to the Medicines for Human 
Use (Clinical Trials Regulations) 2004 (hereafter ‘CTR 2004’).22 Child participation 
in clinical research studies is essential for vaccine licensure and public health policy, 
but little is known about parental decision-making in this context and why parents 
agree to engage in clinical research studies involving their children.23 It is hoped that 
studies about parental decision-making can improve understanding of parental 
perceptions of the trials process and this could enhance recruitment to and conduct of 
essential paediatric vaccine research.24 
 
 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 PK Pletsch, and PE Stevens, ‘Children in Research: Informed Consent and Critical Factors Affecting 
Mothers’ (2001) 7(1) Journal of Family Nursing 50. 
22 The CTR 2004 implemented the Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC in the UK, and is most 
significant for research involving medicinal products; Council Regulation (EC) 1901/2006 on 
medicinal products for paediatric use operates together with the CTR 2004 specifically to promote 
research on the paediatric population. The New Regulation No 536/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, adopted on 16 April 2014, 
updates the rules on clinical trials and repeals Directive 2001/20/EC: http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-
use/clinical-trials/developments/index_en.htm (last accessed 9 April 2015). The Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (hereafter ‘MCA 2005’) applies to all ‘intrusive research’, which does not fall within the remit of 
the CTR 2004 in the UK. The common law must be consulted for cases of medical research that do not 
qualify as a clinical trial under the CTR 2004, and are not a case of ‘intrusive research’ under the MCA 
2005. 
23 TEA Chantler, A Lees, ER Moxon, D Mant, AJ Pollard, R Fitzpatrick, ‘The Role Familiarity With 
Science and Medicine Plays in Parents’ Decision-Making About Enrolling a Child in Vaccine 
Research’ (2007) 17 Qualitative Health Research 311. Note the controversy surrounding the MMR 
(measles, mumps and rubella) vaccine triggered by Andrew Wakefield’s paper in the Lancet; 
Wakefield was not advising against vaccination completely, but was advising that single vaccinations 
be given. More recent developments have been in the form of government concession in the US 
Vaccine Court and a published study that verifies the research of Wakefield’s and others on the link 
between the MMR vaccine and autism: http://healthimpactnews.com/2013/new-published-study-
verifies-andrew-wakefields-research-on-autism-again/ (last accessed 9 April 2015).  
24 TEA Chantler, A Lees, ER Moxon, D Mant, AJ Pollard, R Fitzpatrick, ‘The Role Familiarity With 
Science and Medicine Plays in Parents’ Decision-Making About Enrolling a Child in Vaccine 
Research’ (2007) 17 Qualitative Health Research 311, at p 311. 
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The data analysis in one study, in which parents were interviewed about their decision 
for or against enrolling their child in a vaccine study, suggests that the ability of 
parents to evaluate a vaccine study depends on “how attuned they are with science 
and medicine, either professionally or as consumers of health services”,25 and that this 
familiarity is “a predictor of parents’ confidence in their decision-making”.26 Altruism 
and trust was found to motivate many parents, but concern is raised that if this 
altruism and trust is “uninformed”27 parents can be prone to exploitation, and so it is 
crucial to ensure that parents are confident about both their judgement of a particular 
study and the potential benefit to their child and society.28  
 
 
The vaccine research paper looks at a preschool booster study (recruiting children 
aged 3-3.5 years to the trial), which involved two home visits, and a meningitis 
vaccine study (recruiting infants aged 1 year), which involved three home visits.29 
Interviewees of the vaccine study expressed the view that it was important to continue 
medical advancement for the benefit of society, however they believed that children 
should take part in research only where the medical benefits are considered to 
outweigh any potential risks. 30  It is noted that, in taking very seriously their 
responsibility of deciding on behalf of their child, parents would evaluate the risks 
and benefits to ensure that “the advantages both for the child and for other children 
outweighed any disadvantages”.31 Thus, child and children were factored into the 
parental decision-making process, whilst acknowledging that they, the parents, are 
making a decision on the behalf of their child.  
 
 
The vaccine research study found a combination of reasons cited by parents willing 
for their child to participate in a vaccine study, however altruism was found to be the 
most quoted reason for participation. 32  It was found that “[p]arents wanted to 
contribute to medical advancement and, specifically, to help children. Participation 
was viewed as a social responsibility by some parents, particularly if they or their 
family had benefited from medicine advancement”.33 Some parents also appealed to 
their professional background in the field of medicine or research and how this 
encouraged their participation, as “they were interested or felt a sense of professional 
responsibility to take part”.34 Parents’ willingness to take part, in some cases, also 
depended on the importance they attributed to the study. So, for example, some 
parents considered that the aim of reducing the pain of post-vaccination reactions was 
 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 More details about the vaccine studies at pp 313-314. 
30 TEA Chantler, A Lees, ER Moxon, D Mant, AJ Pollard, R Fitzpatrick, ‘The Role Familiarity With 
Science and Medicine Plays in Parents’ Decision-Making About Enrolling a Child in Vaccine 
Research’ (2007) 17 Qualitative Health Research 311, at p 315. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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not worth their child having to undergo a potentially painful blood test, whereas other 
parents considered anything that helped develop new vaccines was worthwhile.35  
 
 
Parents who were positive about research participation demanded reassurance that the 
study would not have a detrimental effect on their child. This assessment of detriment 
took the form of two main issues being considered by parents: their child’s suitability 
to the study and the safety of the study. Conclusions reached from this vaccine 
research study focussed on the fact that there is “insufficient understanding of the 
nature and origins of such altruistic behaviour on the part of participants in health 
research” and that there “is enormous scope for further improvements in the health of 
children from public health research but only if we can learn how to work 
appropriately with the altruism and trust of parents”.36 
 
 
ii. Clinical trials of emerging therapies for diabetes37 
 
 
Results from a study in the US analysing decision-making for involvement in clinical 
research of mothers of diabetic children, suggests that “mothers engage in a personal 
calculus”38 before making their decision. In maintaining treatment of children living 
with diabetes, diabetic children and their parents are regularly approached by clinical 
researchers for clinical trials of emerging therapies.39 Mothers’ perspectives were the 
focus of the report. Mothers were considered “advocates for their children”40 and the 
experiences of mothers of children with diabetes were considered to be “sufficiently 
distinct to merit separate analysis”41 from other illness populations that participated in 
a larger study.42 The research questions that guided the analysis of this study were: (1) 
How do mothers of children with diabetes make decisions about giving consent for 
their children to participate in research?  (2) What motivates mothers to keep their 
children in research once they are enrolled? (3) How do mothers evaluate the clinical 
studies their children have participated in?43 The important context of this study is the 
nature of childhood diabetes, with the most common type in the paediatric population 
 
35 Ibid, at p 316; further detail is however not provided to confirm what these parents deemed 
‘worthwhile’ and what the parents meant by doing ‘anything’ to help develop new vaccines. 
36 Ibid, at p 321. 
37 PK Pletsch, and PE Stevens, ‘Inclusion of Children in Clinical Research: Lessons Learned from 
Mothers of Diabetic Children’, (2001) 10 Clinical Nursing Research 140. 
38 Ibid, at p 140. 
39 Ibid. The US federal guidelines mandating inclusion of children in clinical research meant that more 
and more children would be sought as participants in clinical trials; while the new policy gave 
researchers the opportunity to conduct more research to help treat children and not have to rely on 
research conducted exclusively with adults, concerns were raised about how to ethically enrol, retain, 
and involve children in research, and it became necessary to investigate such concerns in order to 
“arrive at a just and adequate research practice that includes children”: PK Pletsch, and PE Stevens, 
‘Inclusion of Children in Clinical Research: Lessons Learned from Mothers of Diabetic Children’, 
(2001) 10 Clinical Nursing Research 140, at p 141. 
40 PK Pletsch, and PE Stevens, ‘Inclusion of Children in Clinical Research: Lessons Learned from 
Mothers of Diabetic Children’, (2001) 10 Clinical Nursing Research 140, at p 141. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid; the larger study involved children from four illness populations, diabetes, sickle-cell anemia, 
oncology, and bone marrow transplant. 
43 Ibid. 
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being insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (IDDM), so treatment is complex and 
demanding.44  Diabetes in children is described as “a chronic illness that intimately 
affects the everyday life of the family”.45  
 
 
It was found that, “personal calculus in making research participation choices”46 
involved a careful calculation of potential consequences for their children, before 
consenting or declining to participate, focussing on three main ‘calculations’: firstly, 
judging whether their child’s well-being was likely to suffer disruption, in the form of 
disturbing the daily metabolic control and stability that had already been achieved; 
secondly, an analysis of personal benefits that their child could potentially receive 
through involvement in a clinical study; and thirdly, weighing the opportunities of 
research participation against the risks that their children might incur. 47  The 
reasonableness of participation was measured against any disruption to child and 
family.48  
 
 
In evaluating satisfaction with their children’s research experience, it was found that 
the issue of benefit was “pivotal to their satisfaction”,49 but one key difference was 
found before and after the study:  
 
Before their child started a study, mothers were focussed on whether study 
participation would make daily illness-related behaviours easier, more 
convenient, or less painful. After their child had finished a study, mothers had 
a wider view of personal benefit, both expected and unexpected, and they 
recognised social benefit as well. It was as though mothers’ perspectives on 
benefit broadened through experience over time in the research.50 
 
Unanticipated personal benefits included “increased time and connection with health 
care providers”,51 “improvement in children’s self-care skills”,52 and, perhaps most 
important of all, “[c]hanges in a child’s self-concept or attitude toward the illness”53 
with one mother stating that: “The study built up my kid’s self-esteem. …If there is 
something out there, some other study that can get rid of it for him or make it easier 
for him, he will go for it now”.54 Some mothers however, did not have a positive 
experience of research participation, and were dissatisfied with the personal benefits, 
instilling caution about affiliation in future studies as opposed to having the effect of 
 
44 Ibid, at p 142. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid, at p 146. 
47 Ibid. Recruitment for the clinical studies was usually initiated at clinic visits or educational 
programs. 
48 This study also discusses monetary recompense; note the system of health insurance in the US, with 
families often possessing different levels of health insurance, and how a balancing of opportunity 
against potential risk is likely to include this factor, as compared to the UK. Further discussion about 
offering incentives for research participation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
49 PK Pletsch, and PE Stevens, ‘Inclusion of Children in Clinical Research: Lessons Learned from 
Mothers of Diabetic Children’, (2001) 10 Clinical Nursing Research 140, at p 154. 
50 Ibid, at pp 154-155. 
51 Ibid, at p 155. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, at pp 155-156. 
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facilitating openness to future studies.55 This was primarily because the mothers did 
not feel that the health and well-being of their child was the primary concern. But one 
mother admitted that: “Maybe it was naive on my part to think the drug company 
doing the research would have the children’s best interests at heart”.56 
 
 
Researchers described a finding about the notion of ‘social benefit’ in the following 
way: “If personal benefit from being in a study was secured, social benefit took on 
meaning”.57 One mother made a distinction between help “on the small scope” to her 
daughter, and help “on the larger scope” to others, stating that “it would be nice to 
help everyone who had to deal with diabetes”.58  In fact, it was found that most 
mothers found it “gratifying” to be participating in research, to engage in the effort to 
“find answers” and to “move forward” to improve treatment for not just their own 
child, but for all diabetic children.59 Interviews with parents and families “revealed a 
solidarity with other families who knew what it was like to live with diabetes, and an 
obligation to contribute to advancing knowledge of diabetes and diabetes 
management”. 60  Parents described their child’s participation in the research as 
“helping out”, “to help the diabetes effort”, and transferred this intention to their 
children, with one mother stating that: “It was neat for my son to know that he was 
part of something. Yes, he has this disease, but he was in something bigger, 
something positive that was trying to make things a little easier for kids and 
parents”.61  
 
 
It is noted that, missing from this particular study and analysis, is information about 
those mothers who were unwilling to consent to their diabetic child’s participation in 
clinical research.62 More knowledge about ‘non-consenting’ is likely to provide useful 
information about the process of decision-making that some parents go through, and 
to what extent they adopt both an individualistic and relational perspective to child 
participation in research before refusing consent.  
 
 
iii. Childhood cancer clinical trials  
 
 
In a study that looked at the meaning and experience of clinical trial participation for 
Canadian parents of children with cancer, 63  and the conditions and feelings that 
influenced their decisions, a key theme identified was “helping future families of 
 
55 Ibid, at p 156. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, at pp 156-157. 
60 Ibid, at p 157. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, at p 158. 
63 RL Woodgate, and RA Yanofsky, ‘Parents’ Experiences in Decision-Making with Childhood Cancer 
Clinical Trials’, (2010) 33(1) Cancer Nursing 11. JA Deatrick, DB Angst, and C Moore, ‘Parents’ 
views of their Children’s Participation in Phase I Oncology Clinical Trials’, (2002) 19 Journal of 
Pediatric Oncology Nursing 114; R Schaffer, et al., ‘Parents’ Online Portrayals of Pediatric Treatment 
and Research Options’, (2009) 4(3) Journal of Empirical Research of Human Research Ethics 73. 
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children with cancer”.64 Being informed of past successes did not necessarily trigger 
this approach, but rather, parents were “genuinely concerned” about helping future 
families of children diagnosed with cancer, with one mother stating:  
 
It is relevant to society. It is relevant to future care analysis, of individuals 
which is why I did want to be a part of it. It is relevant to me as a parent who 
can prevent some other child getting care that they don’t need, or get better 
care than they could have gotten because my child took part in the trial.65  
 
It is useful to learn from this study, through the language adopted, that parents did in 
fact consider themselves now part of “a unique community”,66 or “part of the chain of 
people”, 67  and whilst this ‘membership’ encouraged those who consented to 
participation, it resulted in much guilt for those parents who declined participation.68 
Thus, to participate or not to participate is a secondary thought in some respect, since 
parents who declined also accepted membership of a ‘community’ through their 
feelings of guilt. 
 
 
It was concluded that the analysis in this study confirmed “the childhood cancer 
experience is a relational process shaped by evolving intrapersonal, interpersonal, and 
transpersonal relationships and communication”, 69  with parents’ suffering made 
“more bearable”70 because of meaningful relationships that parents had with, not only 
their own children, but other families of children with cancer, with healthcare team 
members also providing crucial support.71 Parents were found to associate making the 
“right” decision with being a “good” parent.72 In light of these findings, and “the 
emphasis parents placed on the relational aspect of their experiences”, conclusions in 
this study include the importance of “[u]nderstanding the processes that link human 
relationships and the relief of suffering in the context of childhood cancer trials”.73 
 
 
 
64 RL Woodgate, and RA Yanofsky, ‘Parents’ Experiences in Decision-Making with Childhood Cancer 
Clinical Trials’, (2010) 33(1) Cancer Nursing 11; this was one of six themes that emerged from the 
data analysis, with the other five themes being, “living a surreal event”, “wanting the best for my 
child”, “coming to terms with my decision”, “making one difficult decision among many”, and 
“experiencing a sense of trust”. 
65 RL Woodgate, and RA Yanofsky, ‘Parents’ Experiences in Decision-Making with Childhood Cancer 
Clinical Trials’, (2010) 33(1) Cancer Nursing 11, at p 14. 
66 Ibid, at p 15. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid, at p 16. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. Other studies focusing on end-of-life decision-making and enrolment in clinical trials have 
considered this notion of a “good” parent: P Hinds, et al., ‘End-of-life care preferences of pediatric 
patients with cancer’, (2005) 23(36) Journal of Clinical Oncology 9146; JR Kane, MB Hellsten, A 
Coldsmith, ‘Human suffering: the need for relationship-based research in pediatric end-of-life care’, 
(2004) 21(3) Journal of Pediatric Oncology Nursing 180. Also, one study revealed that it was 
important for parents of dying children to know that they had been “good” parents: RL Woodgate, 
‘Living in a world without closure: reality for parents who have experienced the death of a child’, 
(2006) 22(2) Journal of Palliative Care 75. 
73 RL Woodgate, and RA Yanofsky, ‘Parents’ Experiences in Decision-Making with Childhood Cancer 
Clinical Trials’, (2010) 33(1) Cancer Nursing 11, at p 17. 
 11 
iv. Neonatal clinical trials 
 
 
Neonatology is a relatively young discipline and many aspects of care are yet to be 
investigated. Parents of sick newborn babies are often approached to consider the 
enrolment of their child into clinical trials.74 One particular exploratory study aimed 
to help address the gap in the literature about the understanding of parents and the 
process by which they make decisions to enrol their child into trials, exploring the 
thoughts and feelings of parents in either choosing or declining to participate in 
neonatal clinical trials.75 The study focused particularly on the fact that “there is a 
dearth of information… as to why some parents decline to participate”,76 with more 
information available about ‘consenting parents’ who often express altruistic views77 
as the reason for enrolling their infants into research, or consider it a moral obligation 
to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and society.78  
 
 
The exploratory study found that parents make their decision “following a typical 
journey”: 79  first, parents must overcome the initial shock of having their baby 
admitted to the NICU, and then parents weigh up the risks and benefits of the trial 
against the need to protect their baby from perceived harm.80 During this study, the 
NICU was involved in three “non-urgent clinical trials”: a ventilation trial comparing 
two modes of CPAP ventilation, a blood transfusion trial that was comparing a single 
infusion to a divided dose twenty-four hours apart, and an immunoglobulin trial 
comparing this with a placebo.81 It was found that parents who chose to participate 
believed that there was no harm to their baby and these parents display altruistic 
principles stating that they were pleased to be helping future babies.82 I think it should 
however be noted that the altruistic views and “feel good factor” came into ‘the 
journey’ after harms and benefits had been assessed by these parents and after the 
parents initial views of confusion and shock about being approached to consider trial 
participation at such an emotional time. Parents were found to experience “a gradual 
acceptance of the situation”83 within a few days, during which time they began to 
 
74 S Jollye, ‘An exploratory study to determine how parents decide whether to enrol their infants into 
neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 15 Journal of Neonatal Nursing 18. In N Singhal, K Oberle, E Burgess, 
J Huber-Okrainec, ‘Parents’ perceptions of research with newborns’, (2002) 22(1) Journal of 
Perinatology 57, it is specifically argued that there is a gap in literature investigating parental attitudes 
to neonatal research. 
75 S Jollye, ‘An exploratory study to determine how parents decide whether to enrol their infants into 
neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 15 Journal of Neonatal Nursing 18, at p 19. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. KS Hoehn, et al., ‘What factors are important to parents making decisions about neonatal 
research? (2005) 90 Archives of Disease in Childhood Fetal and Neonatal Edition F267; A 
Gammelgaard, et al., ‘Perceptions of parents on the participation of their infants in clinical research’, 
(2006) 91 Archives of Disease in Childhood 977. 
78 S Jollye, ‘An exploratory study to determine how parents decide whether to enrol their infants into 
neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 15 Journal of Neonatal Nursing 18, at 19. SA Mason, and PF Allmark, 
for the EURICON study, ‘Obtaining informed consent to neonatal randomized controlled trials: 
interviews with parents and clinicians in the EURICON study’, (2000) 356 Lancet 2045. 
79 S Jollye, ‘An exploratory study to determine how parents decide whether to enrol their infants into 
neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 15 Journal of Neonatal Nursing 18, at p 19. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, at p 18. 
83 Ibid, at p 20. 
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form relationships with staff and this empowered parents to ask more questions about 
clinical trial participation. Some parents interpreted ‘research’ as alluding to the 
possibility that things can “go wrong”,84 whilst others expressed uncertainty about 
follow-up once the trial was completed and whether their child would get “checked 
up”.85 But upon clarification about their baby’s situation and grasping the concept of 
the clinical trial, parents began to weigh up the risks and benefits to their baby.86 
 
 
The study found that those parents who gave their consent to research “developed”87 
an altruistic view by seeing themselves as helping babies in the future.88 The parents 
acknowledged those “previous parents” who had been involved in research that had 
resulted in help to their baby and expressed a desire “to show their appreciation by 
helping future babies”.89 Parents were “upon reflection”90 pleased to have participated 
in the research.91 When some parents were asked if they would want to be involved in 
more trials, many parents opined that “they would be happy providing they saw a 
benefit to the trial and there was no perceived harm to their child”. This approach to 
decision-making would suggest that first in their assessment of whether to consent to 
their child participating in a research trial they consider the benefit or value of the trial 
itself before proceeding to assess any potential harms to their child, and so this 
indicates that parents engage in a form of assessment for the wider community of 
children of which their child is a member before they assess whether their child will 
be involved in the trial. It was in fact found that parents who chose to participate in 
the clinical trial “displayed an overwhelming sense of satisfaction”92 and it gave them 
“a sense of pride and well being”,93 with one parent stating: “If we’ve helped now for 
something in the future then you’ve done your bit – you know what I mean?”94 
 
 
On the other hand, it was found that parents who declined participation felt that the 
perceived risks to their baby were too great, and outweighed the benefits.95 These 
parents feared that their baby might endure, in their view, further suffering, and that if 
their baby’s condition deteriorated then fault would lay with them for making the 
decision to enrol their baby in the trial.96 However, upon reflection, these ‘declining 
parents’ experienced feelings of guilt at reaching this decision and not participating in 
 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, at p 22. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, mother in interview G. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. C Snowdon, D Elbourne, J Garcia, ‘Declining enrolment in a clinical trial and injurious 
misconceptions: is there a flipside to the therapeutic misconception? (2007) 2(4) Clinical Ethics 193; C 
Snowdon, D Elbourne, J Garcia, ‘“It was a snap decision”: parental and professional perspectives on 
the speed of decisions about participation in perinatal randomized controlled trials’, (2006) 62 Social 
Science and Medicine 2279. 
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the trial,97  expressing an acknowledgement that “they [clinicians and researchers] 
have to do these things to develop”.98 In explanations for declining participation was 
the feeling among parents that more time to make the decision with prior knowledge 
about trial participation, before their baby was unwell, is likely to have better 
prepared parents to make a decision.99  
 
 
It is emphasised in the study that while parents did not feel any pressure to enrol in a 
trial, they nevertheless “experienced guilt upon reflection for not participating and in 
hindsight wondered whether they should have participated”.100 The study concludes 
that more research is needed to understand why parents experience such guilt.101 
While I agree that more research must be undertaken to confirm why parents 
experience such guilt, the studies suggest that feelings of guilt also indicate that 
parents engage in a more relational approach to decision-making that incorporates a 
sense of responsibility to the ‘class’ or wider community of children, and that parents 
struggle between assessing the value of a study in their own risk-benefit analysis for 
their own individual child, and the wider community of children of which their child 
is a member. 
 
 
Another neonatal clinical trials study102 draws particular attention to the fact that, in 
the US, treatment in the NICU is driven more and more by research protocols, and so 
family perspectives of being involved in neonatal research is being increasingly 
considered. However, it is found that few investigations have explored family 
experiences.103 Ward opines that “[t]he traditional way for understanding choice about 
research enrolment, with its moral thrust on informed consent and autonomous 
decision-making, needs further development”,104 with only a small number of studies 
having actually examined parental beliefs about neonatal research.105 In this particular 
study, parents who had enrolled their child in a research study that involved greater 
than minimal risk with prospect of direct benefit to the neonate were asked about their 
beliefs and experiences with respect to their neonate’s research participation.106 Ward 
advocates that “by examining the entire process of their neonate’s research 
participation rather than focussing on a specific component (for example, validity of 
 
97 S Jollye, ‘An exploratory study to determine how parents decide whether to enrol their infants into 
neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 15 Journal of Neonatal Nursing 18, at p 22. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. BJ Stenson, JC Becher, N McIntosh, ‘Neonatal research: the parental perspective’, (2004) 89 
Archives of Disease in Childhood F321; SA Mason, PJ Allmark, ‘Obtaining informed consent to 
neonatal randomised controlled trials: interviews with parents and clinicians in the EURICON study’, 
(2000) 356 Lancet 2045; C Snowdon, J Garcia, D Elbourne, ‘Making sense of randomisation; 
responses of parents of critically ill babies to random allocation of treatment in a clinical trial’, (1997) 
45 Social Science and Medicine 1337. 
102 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156. 
103 Ibid, at p 156. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, at pp 156-157. 
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parental permission or understanding of randomisation), a more nuanced and 
comprehensive view of parental perception was obtained”.107  
 
 
Ward’s analysis found that particular themes surrounding research participation 
emerged, and chose to organise these in the following three categories: chaos, 
vulnerability, and control. 108  “Chaos” 109  broadly reflects the feelings of fear and 
confusion experienced by many parents at the time of making the decision about 
neonatal research participation. 110  “Vulnerability” 111  covers parents express 
perceptions of their own vulnerability, 112  filtering into the issue of risk-benefit 
analysis and parents speaking about how important it is to weigh the risks and 
benefits of the research.113 Parents felt that the responsibility to make a decision about 
research participation was “a parental duty”,114 despite many finding it very difficult, 
with parents expressing fears of making the wrong decision about neonatal research 
involvement. 115  “Situational vulnerability” is a term used by Ward, stating that  
“[s]ituational vulnerability for parents resulted from the circumstances of their child’s 
critical illness”, with parents feeling “vulnerable because of the unfamiliar and 
frightening conditions in which they found themselves”, and part of this vulnerability 
mentioned by some parents “was their roles as parents in the NICU”.116 The third 
theme of “control”117 that emerged from the data reflects the control over decision-
making, and so reflects parents’ understanding of their right to permit or decline the 
enrolment of their child in research.118 It was confirmed in this study that knowledge 
of potential risks and benefits of research participation is “not only a requirement of 
ethical research, but also a necessity for parents’ satisfaction in the process of 
decision-making”.119  
 
 
Ward applies care ethics to decision-making frameworks that regulate child 
participation in medical research by including the work of Carol Gilligan in her 
analysis, albeit to compare it to a different theoretical framework of naturalistic 
decision-making (NDM).120 Ward considers that parents’ descriptions of enrolling 
their neonates in research are consistent with the theoretical framework of naturalistic 
decision-making, according to which decisions are influenced by personal 
 
107 Ibid; in this study the following were excluded: families who were unable to speak or understand 
English, and families whose neonate had not been discharged home or had died. 
108 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156, at p 157. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid, at pp 157-158. 
111 Ibid, at p 158. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid, at p 159. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, at p 160. 
120 Relevant works include C Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard University Press, 1982); In a 
Different Voice – Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Harvard University Press, 1993). I 
will analyse care ethics in more detail in the following section of this paper. 
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circumstances and are made in changing contexts. 121  Ward opines that parental 
decision-making to enrol their neonates in research trials “typify NDM” because the 
decisions are distinguished by various complexities that are characteristic of decision-
making in actual real world situations, such as time pressure, uncertainty, and the high 
personal stakes at play.122 Ward compares naturalistic decision-making to the work of 
Gilligan, stating that emphasis is needed on how “moral decisions are made by 
individuals within an intricate network of interdependent relationships”, and that 
“[c]ontext and responsibility to specific others are crucial to decision-making”.123 
Ward notes that it has been demonstrated by decision-making researchers that 
“decisions based on emotion, affective features and hypervigilance, which are 
contextual elements present when parents are making decisions about clinical 
research, are not necessarily dysfunctional”.124  
 
 
v. Concluding observations 
 
 
The empirical evidence reflects a necessity to focus on the ‘experience’ of the child 
and family in the context of their caring relationships, and the responsibilities that 
flow from these relationships. It is also necessary to consider the connection and 
sense of responsibility found with other children and the families of other children. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence confirms that some distinction should be made 
between (i) clinical research on children with life threatening conditions, such as 
cancer, (ii) clinical research on children who have chronic illnesses that pose no 
 
121 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156, at 160; J Noone, ‘Concept analysis of decision-making’, (2002) 37(3) 
Nursing Forum 21. 
122 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156, at 160; R Lipshitz, G Klein, J Orasanu, E Salas, ‘Focus article: taking 
stock of naturalistic decision-making’, (2001) 14 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 331; R 
Lipshitz, ‘Converging themes in the study of decision making in realistic settings’, in GA Klein, J 
Orasnu, R Calderwood, C Zsambok, (eds) Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, (Ablex 
Publishing: Norwood, NJ, 1993), pp 103-137. 
123 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156, at p 160. E Burgess, N Singhal, H Amin, DD McMillan, H Devrome, 
‘Consent for clinical research in the neonatal intensive care unit: a retrospective survey and a 
prospective study’, (2003) 88 Archives of Disease in Childhood Fetal and Neonatal Edition F280, 
discussion F285-F286; N Singhal, K Oberle, E Burgess, J Huber-Okrainec, ‘Parents’ perceptions of 
research with newborns’, (2002) 22(1) Journal of Perinatology 57; JA Zupancic, P Gillie, DL Streiner, 
JL Watts, B Schmidt, ‘Determinants of parental authorization for involvement of newborn infants in 
clinical trials’, (1997) 99 Pediatrics 1. 
124 FR Ward, ‘Chaos, vulnerability and control: parental beliefs about neonatal clinical trials’, (2009) 
29 Journal of Perinatology 156, at p 160; for more detail see, for example, TD Wilson, and JW 
Schooler, ‘Thinking too much – introspection can reduce the quality of preferences and decisions’, 
(1991) 60 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 181; TD Wilson, DJ Lisle, JW Schooler, SD 
Hodges, KJ Klaaren, SJ Lafleur, ‘Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction’, 
(1993) 19 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 331; A Bechara, ‘The role of emotion in 
decision-making: evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage’, (2004) 55 Brain 
Cognition 30; SC Chuang, ‘Sadder but wiser or happier and smarter? A demonstration of judgment and 
decision-making’, (2007) 141 Journal of Psychology 63; JH Johnston, JE Driskell, E Salas, ‘Vigilant 
and hypervigilant decision making’, (1997) 82 Journal of Applied Psychology 614. 
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immediate danger of death, and (iii) clinical research on children who are not 
suffering from any illness.125  
 
 
In looking at the different studies of decision-making about participation in research 
and clinical trials, the aim that one must in all cases strike an appropriate balance 
between facilitating research and protecting research participants is clear. What is less 
clear is how and to what extent we understand and interpret parents’ motivations for 
research participation, which represent a significant factor in striking the appropriate 
balance. Fisher, McKevitt and Boaz conclude that a “tailored approach… sensitive to 
the differing experiences of parents is needed when discussing potential research 
participation”126, and evidence from the empirical studies suggests that care ethics is 
reflective of how families and children actually make decisions. 
 
 
B. Understanding and interpreting parents’ motivations: ethics of care theory 
 
 
In striking an appropriate balance between facilitating medical research and 
protecting research participants, it is necessary to look beyond the ‘individual 
interests’ of the individual child participant and consider the interests of those in 
caring relationships with the individual child participant and the interests of the ‘ill 
community’ of which the individual child participant is a member. An appeal to 
context and the situation or experience of an individual child must take due account of 
the child in the context of his or her relationships and the responsibilities that can 
arise within these relationships, with the expectation that this is not likely to be the 
same for any two children. Thus, sufficient acknowledgement and appropriate 
treatment of the complex interests and responsibility in caring relationships is crucial 
to determining the suitability of decision-making about child participation in medical 
research.  
 
 
In the next section, I focus on specific principles of research ethics that currently 
underpin ethical and legal frameworks for decision-making about child participation 
in medical research. In doing so, I seek to highlight how the application of care ethics 
can help to develop these principles so that they more accurately reflect the decision-
making process for child participants, their parents, and healthcare professionals. My 
analysis of care theory will follow Robert Leckey’s distinction between “relational 
theory” and communitarianism, and the claim that relational theory can be 
distinguished “in its commitment to the capacity of individuals”.127 In challenging 
allegations that care ethics is merely a form of virtue ethics, I follow Virginia Held’s 
argument; Held argues that a sharp distinction should be drawn between the ethics of 
 
125 PE Stevens, and PK Pletsch, ‘Ethical issues of informed consent: mothers’ experiences enrolling 
their children in bone marrow transplantation research’, (2002) 25(2) Cancer Nursing 81, at p 84. PK 
Pletsch, and PE Stevens, ‘Children in Research: Informed Consent and Critical Factors Affecting 
Mothers’, (2001) 7(1) Journal of Family Nursing 50, at p 68.  
126 HR Fisher, C McKevitt, and A Boaz, ‘Why do parents enroll their children in research: a narrative 
synthesis’, (2011) 37 Journal of Medical Ethics 544, at p 550. 
127 R Leckey, Contextual Subjects, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), at p 10. Further 
discussion about communitarianism is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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care and virtue ethics because the ethics of care focuses on relationships, whereas 
virtue ethics focuses on the individuals’ dispositions.128  
 
 
An ethic of care in decision-making about child participation in research 
 
 
Evidence from empirical studies suggests that a starting point which focuses on 
interdependent relationships rather than the isolated individual research participant 
more accurately reflects the decision-making of parents and families for research 
participation. Evidence of this can be seen in the empirical studies analysed in the 
previous section of this paper. This starting point and approach focused on 
interdependent relationships facilitates a necessary shift from the historical motivation 
of research ethics and law (protection from exploitation and what one minimally owes 
another human being), to embrace a ‘new focus’ on what one can positively give 
another human being129 to meet the dependency needs of individuals in networks of 
relationships and the responsibilities that arise in these relationships.130  
 
 
I have suggested that care ethics provides an improved understanding and 
interpretation of parents’ motivations for research participation. To what extent can 
this improved understanding and interpretation of parents’ motivations based on care 
theory usefully inform principles that underpin existing ethical and legal frameworks 
for decision-making?  
 
 
In examining existing principles of research ethics, it is important to consider the 
principle of human primacy,131 which is, that the interests of the individual should 
prevail over those of science and society. So how can principles of care theory 
usefully inform the principle of human primacy? Should the principle of human 
primacy be informed by “the primacy of human interconnectedness”132 to focus on 
the important contribution of families and carers, and the network of relationships that 
link the wider community of children and their families, which is currently sidelined? 
 
128 V Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal Political and Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006). Cf. TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (Oxford University Press, 
7th edn, 2013). Further discussion about care ethics and virtue ethics is beyond the scope of this paper; 
see M Sander-Staudt, ‘The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics’, (2006) 21(4) Hypatia 
21, and R Halwani, ‘Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics’, (2003) 18(3) Hypatia 161. 
129 R Graaf, and JJM Deldon, ‘A Paradigm Change in Research Ethics’, in J Schildmann, et al. (eds) 
Human Medical Research, (Springer Basel, 2012), pp 155-162, especially p 157; I do not concur with 
Graaf and Deldon’s assertion about what one ‘owes’ to another human being, but find it more 
appropriate to talk about what one can ‘give’ to another human being based on an ethic of care that 
recognises the practice of ‘give and take’ in networks of relationships. 
130 Many of the arguments and suggestions I make could also be applied to adults, those over the age of 
18, being invited to participate in medical research, but further analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper. My discussion continues to focus on those aged 0-18, unless stated otherwise in specific 
examples or cases cited. 
131 See for example S Simonsen, Acceptable Risk in Biomedical Research: European Perspectives, 
(Springer: 2012), at p 53, and G Helgesson, and S Eriksson, ‘Against the principle that the individual 
shall have priority over science’, (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 54, at p 56. 
132 M Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship’, (2000) 8 
Feminist Legal Studies 199. 
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Maria Drakopoulou described Gilligan’s work as: “a vision of human relationships 
and of society grounded upon the primacy of human connectedness, wherein care and 
compassion are seen as fundamental and where emotions, peaceful co-operation, 
empathy, friendship and responsibility are aspired to rather than universal, abstract, 
rational principles (autonomy, freedom, justice, equality and rights)”.133 Public health 
ethics frameworks have also been criticised for being individualistic and thus 
inadequate, and this has led to calls for a more relational perspective to public health 
ethics.134 Daniel Engster135 provides a compelling outlook of how care must expand 
beyond those closest to us. Engster emphasises that, “our desire for survival and 
functioning along with our inevitable dependency makes caring for others in need a 
moral goal written into the very fabric of our existence”.136 Engster states:  
 
It is only by expanding our caring beyond our circle of family and friends and 
extending it to all others in need that we ultimately come to recognise our 
universal human self and experience our interdependency with all other 
human beings. We then come to know ourselves as dependent creatures who 
share with all other human beings a common need for the care of other human 
beings, and discover the morality that lies at the heart of human existence: 
caring.137  
 
 
Jonathan Herring’s analysis of ‘caring relationships’, can be applied to the situation of 
research participation, and not just for individual child participants, but also with 
respect to the wider community of children. Herring’s analysis reflects many of the 
observations noted in the empirical studies above, as he argues:  
 
First, in a caring relationship the interests and identities of the two people 
become intermingled. Their interests become interdependent. It becomes 
impossible to consider the welfare or rights of the one in isolation. Hence the 
focus must be on the relationship, rather than the individuals. Second, the 
language of ‘carers’ is generally taken to refer to those who are caring for 
older people or disabled adults. The unfortunate consequence of this is that it 
sidelines the many other forms of caring that take place, be that of children, 
friends or partners. While the appropriate legal response to different caring 
relationships may vary, it is important to recognise the broader range of care 
work that takes place. Third, and flowing from the previous point, the 
language of ‘carer’ and ‘carer for’ ignores the fact that we all need care. We 
are all vulnerable and rely on others to provide for our needs. To divide 
society up into those providing care and those needing care disguises the 
vulnerability that we all face. Further, for many people in the course of a 
relationship they will at some point be regarded as a ‘carer’ and at another 
point a ‘cared for’; and often both at the same time. To separate the parties in a 
 
133 Ibid. 
134 NP Kenny, SB Sherwin, and FE Baylis, ‘Re-visioning Public Health Ethics: A Relational 
Perspective’, (2010) 101(1) Canadian Journal of Public Health 9, and MJ Roberts, and MR Reich, 
‘Ethical analysis in public health’, (2002) 359 The Lancet 1055; LM Lee, ‘Public Health Ethics 
Theory: Review and Path to Convergence’, (2012) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 85.  
135 D Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (Oxford Scholarship Online: 
May 2007). 
136 Ibid, at p 65. 
137 Ibid, at p 244. 
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relationship into carers and recipients of care oversimplifies the complexities 
of many relationships.138 
 
The first and second features of Herring’s analysis can inform the particular situation 
of a child participating in research, and the attention that needs to be given to those in 
caring relationships with the child in terms of how decision-making about research 
participation is likely to impact relationships and give rise to responsibilities within 
those relationships. The third feature of Herring’s analysis can take us beyond the 
particular relationships between child and family or child and carers, to a network of 
relationships between a child and the wider community of children of which he or she 
is a member, and in turn, the families and/or carers of other children in the wider 
community of children. Any assessment of the rights or medical needs of an 
individual must be made “in a situational context”, and never “a matter of assessing a 
person in isolation”.139 Thus, it can be argued that the needs and rights of each person 
should be considered “in the context of their relationships”.140 Herring draws attention 
to Susan Dodds’ argument that an adequate legal and social system must accept 
human vulnerability and the need for care,141 as Dodds states:  
 
A vulnerability-centred view of the self and of persons is better able to capture 
many of our moral motivations and intuitions than can be captured by an 
autonomy-focused approach. We are all vulnerable to the exigencies of our 
embodied, social and relational existence and, in recognizing this inherent 
human vulnerability, we can see the ways in which a range of social 
institutions and structures protect us against some vulnerabilities, while others 
expose us to risk.142 
 
Dodds’ analysis can be applied to particular concerns in the context of decision-
making about child participation in medical research in terms of justifying the 
altruism of children to participate in research and how it will be someone else, a 
parent or carer, who is likely to make this ‘altruistic decision’ about research 
participation that will benefit present and future children. Using the language of 
“human vulnerability” and “risk” and making a connection between them, reflects the 
practice, or rather, the ‘institution’, of medical research.  
 
 
For cases of research that are expected to fall within the MCA 2005, it is useful to 
note Herring’s analysis about individuals who lack capacity under the MCA 2005 and 
those with whom they are in caring relationships. Herring argues that it is not possible 
to consider the well-being of an individual who lacks capacity without considering the 
well-being of those in caring relationships with him or her because their interests are 
“intertwined”.143 Herring opines that “it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
 
138 J Herring, Caring and the law, (Hart Publishing, 2013), at pp 4-5. For more discussion on themes of 
‘vulnerability’ and ‘care’ in the context of family law see J Wallbank, and J Herring, (eds), 
Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2014). 
139 J Herring, Caring and the law, (Hart Publishing, 2013), at p 86. 
140 Ibid.  
141 Ibid.  
142 S Dodds, ‘Depending on Care: Recognition of Vulnerability and the Social Contribution of Care 
Provision’, (2007) 21 Bioethics 500, at p 510, cited in J Herring, Caring and the law, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), at p 86. 
143 J Herring, Caring and the law, (Hart Publishing, 2013), at p 166. 
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imagine that a decision which severely harms either the carer or the dependent could 
be seen as justified in the context of a relationship”.144 Herring considers how a court 
must bear in mind the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter ‘HRA 1998’) when 
interpreting the meaning of best interests under the MCA 2005; namely Article 8 of 
the ECHR, the right to respect for private and family life, which in this context would 
translate to the right to respect for the private and family life of the person who lacks 
capacity and their carer. 145  Herring suggests that, although these would not be 
arguments made from an ethic of care perspective, they “could be used to support a 
result that would be consistent with it”, 146  presenting the analysis that Article 8 
rights147 of a carer will be engaged if a decision is deemed to severely impact the 
personal life of the carer.  
 
 
To justify child participation in clinical trials that are regulated by the CTR 2004, the 
trial must either relate to a condition from which the minor suffers or must be one 
which can only be carried out on minors; it is further specified that ‘some direct 
benefit for the group of patients involved in the clinical trials is to be obtained from 
that trial’.148 This requirement that ‘some direct benefit is to be obtained’ makes it 
very difficult to justify any research on children because clinical trials involve some 
level of uncertainty about whether the participants will benefit.149 After all, if the 
investigator had sufficient evidence to know that the child participants will benefit 
from taking a new drug, there could be no significant justification for carrying out a 
clinical trial.150 In practice this criteria is not interpreted literally, and what seems to 
be required is that there generally be a realistic possibility that participants may 
benefit from participation.151 If we reflect on empirical data in the previous section of 
this paper, regarding how families make decisions about child participation in clinical 
trials, this provision should be interpreted to take account of all relevant interests at 
play in the decision-making process, thus the interests of the wider community of 
children of which the individual child participant is a member. It is perhaps arguable 
that the New Regulation No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, which updates the rules on 
clinical trials, better reflects all relevant interests at play in decision-making about 
child participation in medical research. One of the conditions that must be met under 
Regulation No 536/2014 is that, 
 
(g) there are scientific grounds for expecting that participation in the clinical 
trial will produce: 
(i) a direct benefit for the minor concerned outweighing the risks and 
burdens involved; or 
(ii) some benefit for the population represented by the minor 
concerned and such a clinical trial will pose only minimal risk to, and 
 
144 Ibid, at p 167. 
145 Ibid, at p 166. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. Under Article 8(2) the interests of a person lacking capacity can only justify interference in the 
rights of the carer if the interests are deemed sufficiently strong to make the interference necessary and 
proportionate.   
148 CTR 2004, Sch 1, Pt 4, para 9. 
149 Jackson, E., Law and the Regulation of Medicines, (Hart Publishing, 2012), at p 41. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
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will impose minimal burden on, the minor concerned in comparison 
with the standard treatment of the minor’s condition.152 
 
To what extent is the insertion of ‘population represented’ a useful amendment? Does 
‘population represented’ better reflect decision-making about research participation 
and how decision-making invokes a conception of responsibility for a medical illness 
or condition? Will this serve to facilitate and support the decision-making process for 
child participants, their parents, and healthcare professionals? 
 
 
The standard of ‘best interests’ will apply to cases of research that will fall within the 
remit of the common law. In such cases it will be appropriate to consider Jo 
Bridgeman’s assertion that, even if one agrees that decisions about the healthcare of 
children and treatment for serious conditions are rightly determined by a ‘best 
interests’ assessment, “as the central question, it makes a difference whether best 
interests are determined according to assumptions of individualism, abstraction or 
according to responsibilities established in relationships”.153 Bridgeman argues that 
“[t]he latter requires a different set of questions to be asked to determine the best 
interests of the child”.154 These “different” sets of questions pertain to: how parents’ 
concerns for the well-being of their children “directs consideration to the needs of the 
individual child”,155 how the responsibilities of parents arising from the parent-child 
relationship “directs consideration to the expertise of parents, their knowledge of the 
child, gained as they care for them”,156 and how medical evidence is only “partial 
evidence about the best interests of the child”,157 being focussed on medical prognosis 
and treatment options. Furthermore, the court is required “to confront, and examine, 
limits to caring”,158 which may involve personal choices, but which may also arise 
within the context of external factors, in terms of the support and resources available 
to parents.159 If one follows Bridgeman’s assertion, that ‘best interests’ are determined 
according to responsibilities established in relationships, then does decision-making 
about research participation invoke a conception of responsibility for a medical illness 
or condition that unites children, families, and physicians? For a physician the 
responsibility will take shape through their professional responsibility and 
specialisation. For children and families, will responsibility be acquired through the 
impact of diagnosis and managing a medical illness or condition? Where the child is 
not suffering from any illness or condition, and the case is vaccination for example, 
will the responsibility be triggered upon acquiring knowledge about the risk of 
disease or illness to child and children if the child is not vaccinated?  
 
152 Article 32 
153 J Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children, and Healthcare Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at p 108; J Bridgeman, ‘Accountability, Support or Relationship? Conceptions 
of Parental Responsibility’, (2007) 58(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 307, and J Bridgeman, 
‘Parental Responsibility, Responsible Parenting and Legal Regulation’, pp 233-249, in J Bridgeman, H 
Keating, C Lind, (eds) Responsibility, Law and the Family, (Ashgate, 2008). 
154 J Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children, and Healthcare Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at p 108. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. A Wade, ‘Being Responsible: ‘Good’ Parents and Children’s Autonomy’, pp 211-229, and, C 
Lind, ‘Conclusion: Regulating for Responsibility in an Age of Complex Families’, pp 269-275, in J 
Bridgeman, H Keating, C Lind, (eds) Responsibility, Law and the Family, (Ashgate, 2008).  
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The discussion and analysis in this paper poses more questions than it answers. But if 
one accepts that ‘best interests’ are determined according to responsibilities 
established in relationships, and decision-making about research participation invokes 
a conception of responsibility for a medical illness or condition, then it is necessary to 
consider whether this conception of responsibility should be more appropriately 
reflected in ethical and legal decision-making frameworks to facilitate and support the 
decision-making process for child participants, their parents, and healthcare 
professionals. 
 
 
An analysis of case law reveals that judges, in their application of the best interests 
test, acknowledge the context in which decisions are made about those who cannot 
decide for themselves, and how a more relational approach to decision-making is 
needed, realising an ethic of care. I will now analyse how ‘best interests’ was defined 
and interpreted in the case of Simms v Simms and another; A v A and another.160 In 
my analysis of Simms, I will consider the cases of Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) 161  and Re Y (Adult Patient) (Transplant: Bone Marrow), 162 
which, although cases about medical treatment and not research, inform my 
understanding of the role of care reasoning in Simms. An analysis of these ‘treatment 
cases’ together with Simms will be relevant for any future cases about experimental or 
innovative treatment as well as any cases of medical research that fall within the remit 
of the common law. 
 
 
The court took a relational view of best interests in the case of Simms, “whereby the 
practical attitude and wishes of the incompetent patient’s relatives set the parameters 
of decision-making concerning their future treatment”.163 But what exactly makes the 
approach to best interests in this case ‘relational’? In Simms the court ruled that an 
experimental treatment would be in the best interests of two patients suffering from 
probable variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease164 who were incompetent to consent to 
any treatment,165 a male patient aged 18 and a female patient aged 16.166 There was no 
guarantee that the treatment would in fact be beneficial, having never been tested on 
humans before, but without intervention they would both die. The mere possibility of 
the treatment being beneficial to the patients proved to be enough to tip the scales of 
 
160 [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam.), [2003] Fam. 83, [2003] 2 WLR 1465, [2003] 1 All ER 669, [2003] 1 
FLR 879, [2003] 1 FCR 361, (2004) 7 CCL Rep. 407, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 236, (2003) 71 
BMLR 61, [2003] Fam. Law 317, (2003) 153 NLJ 21. 
161 Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1996) 35 BMLR 63, [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
162 Re Y (Adult Patient) (Transplant: Bone Marrow) (1996) 35 BMLR 111, [1996] 2 FLR 787, [1997] 
Fam. 110. 
163 J Harrington, ‘Deciding best interests: medical progress, clinical judgment and the “good family”’, 
(2003) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1, at p 7. 
164 vCJD, referred to as the human form of ‘mad cow disease’, or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE).   
165 This was a result of the disease, which involves the progressive impairment of neurological 
functioning. 
166 Simms was decided before the MCA 2005 came into force, and so one might consider that the 
process of decision-making and outcome of Simms might have been different if the case was decided 
post-MCA 2005, given the age of the patients and circumstances of the case.  
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best interests. It was held that treatment would be in their best interests in light of both 
the poor prognosis without treatment and the lack of viable alternatives.167  
 
 
The case of Simms is described as having taken “a broad view of best interests”.168 In 
her discussion of best interests, Butler-Sloss P began by stating that she had to “assess 
the best interests in the widest possible way to include the medical and non-medical 
benefits and disadvantages, the broader welfare issues of the two patients, their 
abilities, their future with or without treatment, the views of the families, and the 
impact of refusal of the applications” and that all such matters had to be “weighed up 
and balanced in order for the court to come to a decision in the exercise of its 
discretion”. 169  She concluded discussion with greatest focus on the views of the 
parents and the impact of refusal of the application on the parents: “In a finely 
balanced case I should give the views of the parents and the effect upon them of 
refusal great weight in the wider considerations of the best interests test which the 
court has to apply to each patient”. 170  If such wider considerations result in a 
relational view of best interests, then it can be considered that, similarly, Butler –
Sloss P took a relational view of best interests in the cases of Re T (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 171  and Re Y (Adult Patient) (Transplant: Bone 
Marrow)172 by giving a certain level of importance to the views and wishes of family 
members with respect to what the family considered to be best for the individual 
patient, and the family’s determination of what was best for the individual patient was 
influenced by their mutually dependent relationships. In the former case, a mother 
opposed that her one-year old child be given a liver transplant and in the latter case, 
the removal of bone marrow from an incompetent patient was authorised for donation 
to her sister.173 Simms, Re T and Re Y represent an elision of interests.174 Harrington 
notes that this elision of interests can in fact be seen as realising the ethic of care as 
articulated by scholars like Gilligan.175 This elision of interests might not be so clear 
for a court to take account of in a situation where the patient’s family is “indifferent 
 
167 A presentation about the treatment decision: D Body, Irwin Mitchell, ‘Re: Jonathan Simms 
(Treatment Decision) 2002 EWHC 2734 (Fam)’, 11 March 2009. A follow up study of the treatment 
established by the MRC in 2004 and finished in 2006: (2008) 15(5) European Journal of Neurology 
458. 
168 J Harrington, ‘Deciding best interests: medical progress, clinical judgment and the “good family”’, 
(2003) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1, at p 6. ‘Incompetent Patients, experimental Treatment 
and the ‘Bolam Test’: J.S. v. An N.H.S. Trust; J.A. v. An N.H.S. Trust, (2003) 11 Medical Law Review 
237. Whilst not a case involving a child, An NHS Trust v J [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam.), [2006] All ER 
(D) 73 (Dec.), a case in which the patient’s family opposed the administration of innovative therapy, 
raises difficult questions about how ‘best interests’ is interpreted: P Lewis, ‘Withdrawal of treatment 
from a patient in permanent vegetative state: judicial involvement and innovative “treatment”’, (2007) 
15(3) Medical Law Review 392; L Skene, D Wilkinson, G Kahane, J Savulescu, ‘Neuroimaging and 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in vegetative state’, (2009) 17(2) Medical Law 
Review 245. 
169 [2003] 1 All ER 669, at [60]. 
170 Ibid, at [64]. 
171 Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1996) 35 BMLR 63, [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
172 Re Y (Adult Patient) (Transplant: Bone Marrow) (1996) 35 BMLR 111, [1996] 2 FLR 787, [1997] 
Fam. 110. 
173 S Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare. (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) provides 
more detailed analysis of these cases and discussion about the best interests test. 
174 J Harrington, ‘Deciding best interests: medical progress, clinical judgment and the “good family”’, 
(2003) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1, at p 7. 
175 Ibid. 
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or downright abusive” or where the patient is “more or less alone in the world” or “is 
enmeshed in a web of ‘non-standard’ relationships”, 176  but this should not take 
attention away from situations that do clearly merit a more relational approach to 
decision-making. 
 
 
Case law demonstrates that caring networks and responsibilities cannot be 
disentangled from the central question of a child’s own interests. If we view decision-
making about children through the lens of care theory, is there greater potential to 
effectively accommodate both sets of interests involved and strike a more appropriate 
balance between these sets of interests: (i) the interests of the individual child 
participant with the interests of the community of children, and (ii) the interests of the 
individual child participant with those in caring relationships with the child? I propose 
that a dual “interests” test would provide the basis for justification for cases of child 
participation in medical research and cases of experimental or innovative treatment: is 
the research or experimental and innovative treatment “not against the interests” of 
the individual child participant and “in the interests” of the community of children? If 
the answer to both is in the affirmative then the research or experimental and 
innovative treatment should be administered. The test would not enable the 
recruitment of children into medical research against their wishes. The test would 
provide the much-needed clarity of justification that is not found in the current best 
interest approach. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Many of the empirical studies that focus on motivations for paediatric research 
participation have been conducted in the US, and therefore more empirical studies 
should be conducted in the UK to inform and develop existing findings. Much more 
needs to be said and learnt about the institution of research and the responsibilities 
that individuals can have towards an institution of research because “[w]e must treat 
children with respect by bringing them up as members of families, of communities 
and of a society which values and upholds the rights and obligations of everyone, with 
the interests of children held in the highest esteem”.177 
 
 
A broader approach to decision-making, informed by theoretical principles grounded 
in care ethics, is needed to better appreciate the complexity of the decision-making 
process for research participation. If care ethics can help enhance our understanding 
and interpretation of parents’ motivations for their child’s participation in medical 
research, then it is important to consider how care ethics can inform and develop 
principles that underpin existing ethical and legal decision-making frameworks to 
facilitate and support the decision-making process for child participants, their parents, 
and healthcare professionals.  
 
 
 
176 Ibid. 
177 J Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the welfare principle in family law – conflicting or 
complementary?’ (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 223, at p 234. 
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In looking at the ethical and legal guidance that regulates decision-making about child 
participation in medical research, all guidance essentially looks beyond the interests 
of the individual child participant in one way or another. The guidance either gives 
importance to the parents role in decision-making by requiring their consent (and so 
acknowledging that one must take account of the interests of those in caring 
relationships with the child who will be affected by any decision to participate in 
research in terms of caring for the child), or approves research which is not in the best 
interests of the child participant but is “not against the interests” of the child 
participant and will be “interests” of the community of children. Before reform to 
existing law can be considered, it is necessary to achieve greater consistency in the 
ethical and professional guidance that will inform the law, and to appropriately 
identify the conception of responsibility found in decision-making. If a dual interests 
test (“not against the interests” of the individual child participant and “in the 
interests” of the community of children) can provide the basis for justification for 
cases of medical research participation and the administration of experimental or 
innovative treatment then such a test should be incorporated in ethical and 
professional guidance. Whilst difficult cases about research participation will no 
doubt continue to pose distinctive, challenging and complex questions for decision-
makers, the suitable incorporation of a dual interests test can provide the much-
needed clarity of justification that is lacking in decision-making frameworks. 
 
